Thursday, January 24, 2013

Republic vs. Court of Appeals


REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

FACTS:
                On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.  
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:
I.        Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.
II.      Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.  
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

Leonardo vs. Maravilla


LEONARDO v. MARAVILLA
GR No. 143369 November 27, 2002

FACTS:
Mariano Torres, predecessor-in-interest of respondents, owns a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 2355 (34515). The said land was sold by Mariano to Eusebio Roxas but the latter was not able to register the same due to a legal dispute between Mariano and a certain Francisco Fernandez. Mariano eventually won that case in 1972.

Petitioner now buys the lot from Eusebio Roxas and asked that it be registered under his name. He was not able to do so because the Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title (ODCT) was still in the hands of respondents and that the Register of Deeds made an affidavit that the original copy of TCT No. 2355 (34515) could not be retrieved or located in their office. Petitioner files an adverse claim. On May 1993, the Register of Deeds found the original TCT of the land and annotated thereon the adverse claim filed by petitioner on May 20, 1993.

Petitioner claims that he is the lawful owner of said land having purchased it from Eusebio Roxas and having protected his rights through the annotation of adverse claim when the register of Deeds found the Original TCT. Respondents counter that the action has been barred by prescription and laches, it being filed only 21 years from the time the right of action has commenced. Petitioner claims that his action is an accion reivindicatoria which prescribes in 30 years.

ISSUE:
                Whether or not petitioner’s action is barred by prescription and laches.

HELD:
                Yes. Petitioner’s action is actually an action for specific performance. It is a fundamental principle that ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but by delivery. The delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue of a contract. The execution of the contract is only a presumptive, not conclusive delivery which can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, as when there is failure on the part of the vendee to take material possession of the land subject of the sale in the concept of a purchaser-owner.

Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery, and the execution of a public document does not constitute sufficient delivery where the property involved is in the actual and adverse possession of third persons, it becomes incontestable that even if included in the contract, the ownership of the property in dispute did not pass.

Clearly, the case filed by petitioner was an action for specific performance of a written contract of sale which, pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, prescribes in 10 years from the accrual of the right of action. the annotation on May 20, 1993 of the November 13, 1972 affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. 2355 (34515) afforded no protection to petitioner for the same reason that said belated assertion of his alleged right over the property is barred by prescription and laches.

Moreover, the affidavit of adverse claim registered by petitioner in 1972 was ineffective. The law enforced at the time petitioner filed an adverse claim was Section 110 of Act 496, also known as the Land Registration Act.

Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's assertion that the prescriptive period should commence to run only on May 18, 1993 when the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2355 (34515) was retrieved by the Register of Deeds. The loss of the original title will not prevent petitioner’s pursuit to enforce his right. Otherwise stated, the recovery of the original title or the reconstitution thereof is not the only means by which petitioner could protect his right. Under Article 1155 of the Civil Code - "[t]he prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed in court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor." Petitioner therefore may pursue either judicial or extrajudicial means manifesting his interest in the questioned property in order to interrupt the prescriptive period.

Certainly, petitioner’s action filed on September 6, 1993 is barred by the 10 year prescriptive period from the accrual of his alleged right of action on September 29, 1972. In the same vein, said action is barred by laches having allowed 21 years to lapse before enforcing his alleged right. Laches is defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it.



Palomo vs. CA


PALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

FACTS:
                Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:
                Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.

HELD:
                The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.

Calicdan vs. Cendaña


CALICDAN v. CENDAÑA
G.R. No. 155080 February 5, 2004

FACTS:
                On August 25, 1947, Fermina Calicdan executed a deed of donation whereby she conveyed a parcel of land to respondent Silverio Cendaña, who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon. He occupied the land from 1949 until his death in 1998. On June 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages" against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondent’s possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon.

In his Answer, respondent alleged that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:
                Whether or not the donation is valid.

HELD:
                The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto Calicdan from his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey.
After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent admitted during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista.

Aguirre, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.


AGUIRRE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122249 January 29, 2004

FACTS:
                Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land. After the death of Emilia, Leocadio married his second wife Miguela. When Leocadio died, all his heirs agreed that Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and administer the said property. After Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in which he falsely stated that he was the only heir of Leocadio. It turned out that while Sixto were still alive, he sold a portion of the subject land tp Tiburcio Balitaan and another portion to Maria Bacong, Maria Bacong later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of Leocadio who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but the 3 vendees refused. Resultantly, petitioners filed a suit against them seeking the nullity of the documents and partition thereof. The vendees contended that they acquired the property under the valid deed of sale and petitioners’ cause of action was barred by laches and prescription. Tiburcio also contended that he is an innocent purchaser for value.

ISSUE:
                Whether or not there was a valid sale between Sixto Medrano and the three purchases considering the fact that it was made without the consent of the co-owners.



HELD:
                Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a sale by a co-owner of the whole property as his will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale). The provision clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s share, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owner is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid conveyance only insofar as the share of Sixto in the co-ownership is concerned. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse in so far as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipts of rentals, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised such acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.

Thus, in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

Tested against these guidelines, the respondents failed to present competent evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiate the existing co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano. Respondent’s reliance on the tax declaration in the name of Sixto Medrano is unworthy of credit since we have held on several occasions that tax declarations by themselves do not conclusively prove title to land. Further, respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made known to the other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.

Monday, January 21, 2013

GSIS vs. Santiago



GSIS vs. Santiago
G.R. No. 155206 October 28, 2003


FACTS:
Deceased spouses Jose Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from GSIS from 1956 to 1957 in the total amount of P3,117,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages over their parcels of land.
The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages. On August 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction with defendant GSIS being the highest bidder.  Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles, however, were sold.  Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded from the auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts.  

A Certificate of Sale was issued later on and an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership was executed by defendant GSIS over Zulueta’s lots, including the lots, which as earlier stated, were already excluded from the foreclosure. On March 1980, GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the President. The sold properties were returned to GSIS and the land titles issued in favour of Yorkstown were subsequently cancelled.

Thereafter, GSIS began disposing the foreclosed lots including the excluded ones.

On April 7, 1990, Representative Eduardo Santiago and then plaintiff Antonio Vic Zulueta executed an agreement whereby Zulueta transferred all his rights and interests over the excluded lots.  Plaintiff Santiago’s lawyer wrote a demand letter dated May 11, 1989 to defendant GSIS asking for the return of the eighty-one (81) excluded lots. 

On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by Eduardo M. Santiago, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, and a complaint for reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS.  Spouses Alfeo and Nenita Escasa, Manuel III and Sylvia G. Urbano, and Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of Mamerto Gonzales moved to be included as intervenors and filed their respective answers in intervention.  Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answer alleging inter alia that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches and that the complaint stated no cause of action.  Subsequently, Zulueta was substituted by Santiago as the plaintiff in the complaint a quo.  Upon the death of Santiago in 1996, he was substituted by his widow as the plaintiff. After due trial, the RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey to the respondent, Rosario Enriquez Vda. De Santiago, in substitution of her deceased husband Eduardo, the seventy-eight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale.


ISSUES:

I.              Whether or not the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating ownership and causing the issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale.
II.            Whether or not Petitioner’s defense on prescription is tenable.

HELD:

First Issue:

YES. The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the Zuluetas the existence of these excluded lots, in failing to notify or apprise the spouses Zulueta about the excluded lots from the time it consolidated its titles on their foreclosed properties, in failing to inform them when it entered into a contract of sale of the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown as well as when the said sale was revoked by then President during the same year, demonstrated a clear effort on its part to defraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject properties.  

Even if titles over the lots had been issued in the name of the defendant-appellant, still it could not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion over them because indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system does not attach to titles secured by fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendant-appellant in the form of concealment of the existence of said lots and failure to return the same to the real owners after their exclusion from the foreclosure sale made defendant-appellant holders in bad faith.  It is well-settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.


Second Issue:                                                             
NO. On the issue of prescription, generally, an action for reconveyance of real property based on fraud prescribes in four years from the discovery of fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.  Registration of real property is a constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. On the other hand, Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456.  If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.

The petitioner’s defense of prescription is untenable.  As held by the CA, the general rule that the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real property because it is “considered a constructive notice to all persons” does not apply in this case.  
Contrary to its claim, the petitioner unarguably had the legal duty to return the subject lots to the Zuluetas. The petitioner’s attempts to justify its omission by insisting that it had no such duty under the mortgage contract is obviously clutching at straw.  Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that “every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.”

Alcantara-Daus vs. Spouses De Leon




ALCANTARA-DAUS v. SPOUSES DE LEON
G.R. No. 149750 June 16, 2003

FACTS:
            Spouses De Leon are the owners of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan with an area of Four Thousand Two Hundred Twelve square meters more or less. Respondent Hermoso De Leon inherited the said lot from his father Marcelino De Leon by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. Said lot is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22134 of the Land Records of Pangasinan.

Sometime 1960s, Spouses De Leon engaged the services of the late Atty. Florencio Juan to take care of the documents of their properties.  They were asked to sign voluminous documents by the latter.  After the death of Atty. Juan, some documents surfaced and most revealed that their properties had been conveyed by sale or quitclaim to Hermoso’s brothers and sisters, to Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in truth and in fact, no such conveyances were ever intended by them. Furthermore, respondent found out that his signature in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was forged. They discovered that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo de Leon to Aurora Alcantara

Spouses De Leon demanded the annulment of the document and re-conveyance but defendants refused. Petitioner, Aurora Alcantara-Daus averred that she bought the land in question in good faith and for value on December 1975 and that she has been in continuous, public, peaceful, open possession over the same and has been appropriating the produce thereof without objection from anyone.

The RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered its Decision in favor of herein petitioner.  It ruled that respondents’ claim was barred by laches, because more than 18 years had passed since the land was sold.  It further ruled that since it was a notarial document, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was presumptively authentic.

ISSUES:
           
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute executed by Rodolfo De Leon over the land in question in favor of petitioner was perfected and binding upon the parties therein?

Whether or not the evidentiary weight of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim, executed by respondent Hermoso de Leon, Perlita de Leon and Carlota de Leon in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was overcome by more than a preponderance of evidence of respondents?


HELD:

First Issue:
NO. It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of the seller’s non-ownership of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract.
Further, even after the contract of sale has been perfected between the parties, its consummation by delivery is yet another matter.  It is through tradition or delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of ownership over the thing sold.
Undisputed is the fact that at the time of the sale, Rodolfo De Leon was not the owner of the land he delivered to petitioner.  Thus, the consummation of the contract and the consequent transfer of ownership would depend on whether he subsequently acquired ownership of the land in accordance with Article 1434 of the Civil Code. Therefore, we need to resolve the issue of the authenticity and the due execution of the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim in his favor.

Second Issue:
NO. As a general rule, the due execution and authenticity of a document must be reasonably established before it may be admitted in evidence. Notarial documents, however, may be presented in evidence without further proof of their authenticity, since the certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. To contradict facts in a notarial document and the presumption of regularity in its favor, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.

The CA ruled that the signature of Hermoso De Leon on the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim was forged.  However, this factual finding is in conflict with that of the RTC.  While normally this Court does not review factual issues, this rule does not apply when there is a conflict between the holdings of the CA and those of the trial court, as in the present case.

After poring over the records, the SC finds no reason to reverse the factual finding of the appellate court.  A comparison of the genuine signatures of Hermoso De Leon with his purported signature on the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim will readily reveal that the latter is a forgery.  As aptly held by the CA, such variance cannot be attributed to the age or the mechanical acts of the person signing.